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PART I: INTRODUCTION 
When a person travels across the United States border, whether by 
land, by air, or by sea, that person and their belongings may be subjected 
to a warrantless search and seizure by a border patrol agent.1  According 
to the Supreme Court, these searches do not require probable cause and 
are reasonable by their very nature.2  This line of reasoning makes sense, 
as the security at our borders is paramount,3 especially in the wake of the 
September 11th attacks.  Nevertheless, there has to be some line 
established that the government cannot cross when conducting certain 
border searches, particularly those involving significant privacy interests.  
As technology advances and the digitalization of our personal lives 
continues to increase, the search of personal electronic devices raises 
unique border security concerns, now more than ever. 
In United States v. Seljan, the Ninth Circuit reasoned that the border 
search doctrine cannot stand for the idea that “at the border, ‘anything 
goes.’”4  Moreover, the Supreme Court raised its own concerns in United 
States v. Montoya de Hernandez, suggesting that there was a limited scope 
as to what could be considered “routine” customs searches and 
inspections.5  The problem then becomes defining what can be considered 
a non-routine border search, and the level of suspicion that is required 
before conducting such a search.6  While the government’s interest in 
searches at our international borders is significant, it must still be weighed 
against important individual privacy interests.  In performing this 
balancing of the interests, “the touchstone of the Fourth Amendment 
analysis remains reasonableness.”7 
Thus, as our lives continue to become more and more intertwined 
with our electronic devices, one’s digital life can be seen as an extension 
of that person’s real life, as these devices “contain the most intimate details 
                                                                                                                                     
 1 19 C.F.R. § 162.6  (2010) (stating that “All persons, baggage, and merchandise 
arriving in the Customs territory of the United States from places outside thereof are liable 
to inspection and search by a Customs officer”); see also Border Security: At Ports of 
Entry, U.S. CUSTOMS AND BORDER PROTECTION (last visited Feb. 7, 2015), 
http://www.cbp.gov/border-security/ports-entry (stating that “U.S. Customs and Border 
Protection has a complex mission at ports of entry with broad law enforcement authorities 
tied to screening all foreign visitors, returning American citizens and imported cargo that 
enters the U.S. at more than 300 land, air and sea ports.”). 
 2 See United States v. Ramsey, 431 U.S. 606 (1977). 
 3 See United States v. Flores-Montano, 541 U.S. 149 (2004). 
 4 United States v. Cotterman, 709 F.3d 952, 960 (9th Cir. 2013) (quoting United States 
v. Seljan, 547 F.3d 993, 1000 (9th Cir. 2008)(en banc)). 
 5 United States v. Montoya de Hernandez, 473 U.S. 531, 541 (1985). 
 6 Id. at n.4 (“we suggest no view on what level of suspicion, if any, is required for 
nonroutine border searches”) (emphasis added). 
 7 Cotterman, 709 F.3d at 960 (quoting United States v. Montoya de Hernandez, 473 
U.S. 531, 539 (1985)). 
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of our lives.”8  Although border searches of electronic devices “have 
yielded evidence of illegal conduct[,]” such searches still raise a number 
of “significant privacy concerns.”.9 
The Fourth Circuit was the first court to address whether border 
searches of electronic devices require a heightened standard in United 
States v. Ickes, holding that suspicion is not necessary to perform such 
searches.10  Recognizing that intrusive searches of a person’s electronic 
devices invoke special concerns, the Ninth Circuit departed from this 
suspicionless standard and instead adopted the view that border agents 
should have at least a “reasonable suspicion” before searching a person’s 
electronic devices.11  The United States Supreme Court should adopt a 
reasonable suspicion standard to resolve this circuit split, and preserve 
important individual liberty interests. 
Part II of this Comment provides the background of relevant sources 
to this debate, discussing the factual background of United States v. 
Cotterman and evolution of the border search doctrine as a whole.  Part III 
analyzes these sources, discussing the aptness of the Ninth Circuit’s 
decision, and highlighting where the other circuits have faltered in their 
analysis.  Part IV concludes this Comment. 
PART II: BACKGROUND 
A. Factual Background of United States v. Cotterman 
Howard Cotterman and his wife were crossing the United States-
Mexico border in April 2007.  During a primary inspection, border agents 
came across a hit on the Treasury Enforcement Communications System 
(“TECS”).12  TECS indicated to the border agent conducting the inspection 
that Cotterman was not only a sex offender, but possibly involved in child 
sex tourism as well.13  As a result of the hit, the agents subsequently 
searched Cotterman’s vehicle, where they found two laptops and three 
digital cameras.14  A cursory search of these devices revealed that they 
contained both personal photographs as well as password-protected files.15  
                                                                                                                                     
 8 Id. at 964. 
 9 Mary Ellen Callahan, Privacy issues in border searches of electronic devices, U.S. 
DEP’T OF HOMELAND SECURITY, (October 2009), available at http://www
.dhs.gov/xlibrary/assets/privacy/privacyprivacyissuesborder_searcheselectronicdevices.p
df 
 10 United States v. Ickes, 393 F.3d 501 (4th Cir. 2005). 
 11 Cotterman, 709 F.3d at 966. 
 12 Id. at 957. 
 13 Id. 
 14 Id. 
 15 Id. at 957–58. 
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The border agents contacted Immigration and Customs Enforcement 
(“ICE”) for further instruction in handling the search.16  ICE informed the 
agents that the alert was part of a system that identified registered sex 
offenders in an effort to fight child sex tourism.17  Due to the nature of the 
hit, ICE advised the agents to review any electronic devices, such as his 
computers and cameras, in order to discover whether Cotterman was in 
possession of child pornography.18 
Although the border agents were able to view some of the files on 
Cotterman’s computer, many of the files were still password-protected, 
and therefore inaccessible.19  At this point, ICE agents were en-route to the 
Port of Entry, deciding to perform a more intrusive search of Cotterman’s 
laptops when they arrived.20  Although Cotterman initially offered to help 
access those files that were password-protected, the agents declined 
Cotterman’s offer, fearing that Cotterman might delete the files, or that the 
computer itself was “booby trapped.”21 
The subsequent search revealed seventy-five images of child 
pornography on Cotterman’s laptop.  Notwithstanding this discovery, the 
password-protected files on the laptop were still inaccessible.22  The agent 
who performed the search, ICE Senior Special Agent & Computer 
Forensic Examiner John Owen, conceded at this point that he would need 
Cotterman’s help in order to access the protected files.  Yet Cotterman 
never showed up to assist Agent Owen.23  After another attempt to gain 
his assistance, Cotterman responded that the computer had multiple users.  
Cotterman informed Agent Owen that he would need to contact these other 
people to retrieve their passwords.24 
Despite Cotterman’s lack of assistance, Agent Owen finally opened 
the files on April 11.  Access to these additional files revealed another 378 
images of child pornography.  The vast majority of these images were of 
the same girl over a two-to-three-year period, and many depicted 
Cotterman sexually molesting other children as well.25  A continued search 
over the next few months revealed hundreds more files, including images, 
stories and videos of children.26  When Cotterman’s case went to trial, the 
                                                                                                                                     
 16 Id. at 958. 
 17 Cotterman, 709 F.3d at 958. 
 18 Id. 
 19 Id. 
 20 Id. 
 21 Cotterman, 709 F.3d at 958. 
 22 Id. 
 23 Id. 
 24 Id. at 958–59. 
 25 Id. at 959. 
 26 Cotterman, 709 F.3d at 959. 
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government “sought a broad ruling that no suspicion of any kind was 
required” to perform these searches on Cotterman’s laptops.27 
B. Evolution of the Border Search Doctrine 
The Fourth Amendment of the United States Constitution guarantees 
that “[t]he right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, 
and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be 
violated, and no Warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause  . . . .”28  
When a search occurs, it implicates this right so long as the individual has 
a subjective expectation of privacy, and that expectation is one that society 
objectively recognizes as reasonable.29  Thus, “the ultimate touchstone of 
the Fourth Amendment is ‘reasonableness.’”30 
While obtaining a judicial warrant may generally fulfill this 
requirement,31 a search may, nevertheless, be deemed reasonable if it falls 
within a specific exception to the warrant requirement.32  These exceptions 
include: exigent circumstances,33 automobile searches,34 inventory 
searches,35 consent searches,36 searches in plain view,37 Terry “Stops and 
Frisks,”38 searches incident to arrest,39 and occasions where special needs 
                                                                                                                                     
 27 Id. 
 28 U.S. Const. amend. IV. 
 29 Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 361 (1967)(Harlan, J., concurring). 
 30 Brigham City v. Stuart, 547 U.S. 398, 403 (2006). 
 31 Vernonia School Dist. 47JA v. Acton, 515 U.S. 646, 653 (1995). 
 32 Riley v. California, —- U.S. ——, 134 S.Ct. 2473, 2482 (2014). 
 33 See, e.g., Brigham City, 547 U.S. 398 (allowing a warrantless search when there is 
an “objectively reasonable” belief that a person is seriously injured or threatened with such 
injury); Michigan v. Tyler, 436 U.S. 499, 510 (1978)(reasoning that warrantless entry 
should be allowed to put out a fire and investigate its cause). 
 34 See California v. Acevedo, 500 U.S. 565, 574-75 (1991)(holding that police may, 
without a warrant, search an automobile and the containers within it wherever they have 
probable cause to believe the contraband may be contained). 
 35 See Florence v. Board of Chosen Freeholders, —- U.S. ——, 132 S.Ct. 1510, 1517 
(2012)(noting that deference is given to correctional officers when performing inventory 
searches of inmates); South Dakota v. Opperman, 428 U.S. 364, 372 (1976)(applying the 
inventory search exception to impounded vehicles). 
 36 See, e.g., Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, 412 U.S. 218 (1973)(reasoning that voluntary 
consent to a search eliminates the warrant requirement). 
 37 See Minnesota v. Dickerson, 508 U.S. 366, 375 (1993)(stating that the exception 
applies “if police are lawfully in a position from which they view an object, if its 
incriminating character is immediately apparent, and if the officers have a lawful right of 
access to the object.”). 
 38 Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 21 (1968)(stating that objective reasonableness is the 
proper inquiry in these types of searches). 
 39 See Chimel v. California, 395 U.S. 752, 762 (1969)(reasoning that the two 
justifications for this type of warrantless search are for officer safety and to prevent the 
destruction or concealment of evidence). 
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allow for a search to be performed without a warrant.40  The Supreme 
Court has specifically justified warrantless searches at the United States 
borders under this latter-most category. 
The United States Supreme Court has long upheld the 
constitutionality of unwarranted border searches.41  As such, the Court has 
specifically recognized that, “[t]ravelers may be so stopped in crossing an 
international boundary because of national self-protection reasonably 
requiring one entering the country to identify himself as entitled to come 
in, and his belongings as effects which may be lawfully brought in.”42  As 
part of this longstanding tradition, the Court reached a landmark decision 
in 1977 case United States v. Ramsey.43  In Ramsey, the Court expanded 
the idea of a border search exception by addressing the reasonableness of 
such searches.  The Court reasoned that: 
[b]order searches . . . from before the adoption of the Fourth 
Amendment, have been considered to be “reasonable” by the single fact 
that the person or item in question had entered into our country from 
outside. There has never been any additional requirement that the 
reasonableness of a border search depended on the existence of probable 
cause.44 
Such a broad exception, however, yields complications when applied 
to more intrusive border searches.  In United States v. Montoya de 
Hernandez, the Court was charged with deciding what level of 
intrusiveness could negate the presumption of reasonableness.45 
In Montoya de Hernandez, customs officials performed a rectal 
examination on the defendant, discovering that she had been smuggling a 
balloon filled with cocaine in her alimentary canal.46  The defendant 
argued that such a search was unreasonable.  The Supreme Court 
disagreed, noting that “[w]hat is reasonable depends upon all of the 
circumstances surrounding the search or seizure and the nature of the 
                                                                                                                                     
 40 See Skinner v. Railway Labor Executives’ Ass’n, 489 U.S. 602, 624 
(1989)(reasoning that “[i]n limited circumstances, where the privacy interests implicated 
by the search are minimal, and where an important government interest furthered by the 
intrusion would be placed in jeopardy by a requirement of individualized suspicion, a 
search may be reasonable despite the absence of such suspicion.”); New Jersey v. T.L.O., 
469 U.S. 325 (1980)(applying the special needs doctrine to searches in schools, reasoning 
that a “less exacting” standard than probable cause is required). 
 41 See Boyd v. United States, 116 U.S. 616 (1886); see also Carroll v. United States, 
267 U.S. 132 (1925). 
 42 Carroll v. United States, 267 U.S. 132, 154 (1925). 
 43 United States v. Ramsey, 431 U.S. 605 (1977)(discussing the constitutionality of a 
warrantless search involving an individual’s international letter-class mail). 
 44 Id. at 619. 
 45 United States v. Montoya de Hernandez, 473 U.S. 531 (1985). 
 46 Id. at 535. 
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search or seizure itself.”47  The Court drew on the distinction between 
ordinary searches and seizures, and those that occur at international 
borders.48  The Court reasoned that “the detention of a traveler at the 
border, beyond the scope of a routine customs search and inspection, is 
justified at its inception if customs agents, considering all the facts 
surrounding the traveler and her trip, reasonably suspect that the traveler 
is smuggling contraband in her alimentary canal.”49  While the Court’s 
holding did not require that border patrol agents have probable cause, as 
in the case of normal searches, Montoya de Hernandez opened the door to 
the suggestion that certain types of border searches will not be deemed 
reasonable simply due to the fact that they occurred at a United States 
border. 
The Supreme Court further distinguished the varying levels of border 
searches in United States v. Flores-Montano, when customs officials 
seized marijuana from the defendant’s gas tank.50  As part of their search, 
the customs officials “remov[ed] and disassembl[ed] the tank” to discover 
the defendant’s contraband.51  The Ninth Circuit, citing Montoya de 
Hernandez, had argued that the customs officials needed reasonable 
suspicion before their search of the tank.52 The Supreme Court rejected 
this application of a reasonable suspicion standard, instead asserting that: 
[R]easons that might support a requirement of some level of 
suspicion in the case of highly intrusive searches of the person – 
dignity and privacy interests of the person being searched – simply 
do not carry over to vehicles.  Complex balancing tests to 
determine what is a “routine” search of a vehicle, as opposed to a 
more “intrusive” search of a person, have no place in border 
searches of vehicles.53 
While the Court thus alluded to the fact that a heightened standard 
might be required when dealing with more “highly intrusive searches,”54 
it has yet to address the distinction between those border searches that do 
and those that do not require reasonable suspicion. 
                                                                                                                                     
 47 Id. at 537. 
 48 Id. at 537–39. 
 49 Id. at 541. 
 50 United States v. Flores-Montano, 541 U.S. 149 (2004). 
 51 Id. at 149. 
 52 Id. at 152. 
 53 Id. at 152. 
 54 Id. 
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C. The Fourth Circuit’s Findings in United States v. Ickes 
The Fourth Circuit was the first circuit to directly examine the 
question of whether any level of suspicion was required for border 
searches of personal electronic devices.  In United States v. Ickes,55  the 
defendant was convicted of transporting child pornography across a 
United States border due to the images found on his computer.56  When 
Ickes came to the United States-Canada border, he claimed to be on his 
way home from vacation, but the primary inspector at the border was wary 
of this assertion.  The inspector’s suspicions came about because the van 
that Ickes was traveling in seemed to contain “everything he own[ed].”57  
The inspector therefore referred Ickes to a secondary inspection station.58 
During the search at the secondary station, one of the agent’s 
“suspicions were raised” after viewing a video that seemingly focused on 
“a young ball boy at a tennis match”.59  With this heightened level of 
awareness, the agent commenced a fuller search of the defendant’s van.60  
After searching the vehicle, the agent and his colleague discovered drugs 
and child pornography, as well as a warrant for Ickes’ arrest.61  The agents 
confiscated Ickes’ computer, along with “75 disks containing additional 
child pornography.”62  At trial, Ickes filed a motion to suppress the 
evidence found on his computer and these disks, claiming they were 
obtained through a warrantless search in violation of his rights under the 
First and Fourth Amendments of the United States Constitution.63 
As part of its analysis, the Fourth Circuit looked to the language of 
19 U.S.C.A. §1581(a).  This statute provides, in relevant part: 
Any officer of the customs may at any time go on board of any 
vessel or vehicle at any place in the United States or within the 
customs waters . . . or at any other authorized place . . . and 
examine the manifest and other documents and papers and 
examine, inspect, and search the vessel or vehicle and every part 
thereof and any person, trunk, package or cargo on board.64 
                                                                                                                                     
 55 United States v. Ickes, 393 F.3d 501 (4th Cir. 2005). 
 56 Id. at 502. 
 57 Id. 
 58 Id. 
 59 Id. Although the court ultimately rejects a standard that would necessitate any raised 
level of suspicion for a search of electronic devices, it is interesting to note here that the 
circumstances surrounding this search probably would have met a reasonable suspicion 
standard regardless. 
 60 Ickes, 393 F.3d at 503. 
 61 Id. at 503. 
 62 Id. 
 63 Id. 
 64 19 U.S.C.A. §1581(a) (1954). 
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The defendant argued that because the statute contained no explicit 
reference to electronic equipment, the search of his computer and disks 
were unsupported by the statutory authority.65  The court rejected this 
argument, focusing on the statute’s use of the term “cargo” to support its 
findings.66 
The court noted that “cargo” was defined by Black’s Law Dictionary 
as those “goods transported by a vessel, airplane, or vehicle.”67  Because 
the computer and disks were “cargo” within this meaning and because it 
was “undisputed that [these items] were being transported by [Icke’s] 
vehicle” at the time that the search was conducted, the search was 
authorized by § 1581.68  The court likewise found that the use of the word 
“any” five times in the statute indicated that the 19 U.S.C.A. §1581(a) 
should be construed broadly.69  Furthermore, the court reasoned that past 
cases have also supported this tendency to read §1581 expansively.70  Any 
other reading, according to the court, would “undermine the long-standing 
practice of seizing goods at the border even when the type of good is not 
specified in the statute.”71 
Ickes also argued that the search of his computer and disks was in 
violation of his rights under the United States Constitution.72  He claimed 
that despite the government’s interests of protecting the borders, these 
interests did not outweigh his own privacy interests.73  The court 
disagreed, focusing on the Supreme Court’s rationale in Flores-Montano 
that: 
[t]he government’s interest in preventing the entry of unwanted 
persons and effects is at its zenith at the international border. Time 
and again, we have stated that searches made at the border . . . are 
reasonable simply by virtue of the fact they occur at the border.74 
This government interest in protecting and patrolling the border 
substantially outweighed whatever privacy interest Ickes claimed to have 
in his electronic devices.  The authority under the border search doctrine, 
the court explained, “has a history as old as the Fourth Amendment 
itself.”75 
                                                                                                                                     
 65 United States v. Ickes, 393 F.3d 501, 504 (4th Cir. 2005). 
 66 Id. 
 67 Id. (quoting BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 226 (8th ed. 2004). 
 68 Id. 
 69 Id. 
 70 Ickes, 393 F.3d at 505. 
 71 Id. at 504. 
 72 Id. at 505. 
 73 Id. at 506. 
 74 Id. at 505 (quoting United States v. Flores-Montano, 541 U.S. 149 (2004)). 
 75 Ickes, 393 F.3d at 505. (quoting United States v. Ramsey, 431 U.S. 606, 619 (1977)). 
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The Fourth Circuit likewise refused to create an exception to the 
border search doctrine, grounded in the First Amendment.76  Ickes argued, 
unsuccessfully, that the content on his computer and disks were 
“expressive” and therefore were protected by his First Amendment 
rights.77  In rejecting Ickes’ contention, the court suggested that the 
proposition would create “significant headaches for those forced to 
determine the scope” of the exception.78  Additionally, it would force 
border agents to decide “on their feet” what material is covered by the First 
Amendment.   After making this determination, and if covered by the 
exception, the agents would then have to decide whether or not probable 
cause exists before they can conduct a search.79  The court reasoned that 
“[t]he essence of border search doctrine is a reliance upon the trained 
observations and judgments of customs officials, rather than upon 
constitutional requirements applied to the inapposite context of this sort of 
search.”80 
PART III: ANALYSIS 
A. The Unique Characteristics of Personal Electronic Devices 
Intrusive searches of a person’s electronic devices are inherently 
different from searches performed on other belongings.  By their very 
nature, these devices contain significantly more information about an 
individual’s personal life than any other type of luggage that one may carry 
at an international border.  In fact, “[e]very computer is akin to a vast 
warehouse of information.”81  The types of data contained on computers 
run the gamut from the impersonal to the highly personal.  With the rapid 
advances of modern technology, this range is ever increasing.82  
Notwithstanding this fact, computer users might not even know about 
much of the information that is stored on these devices, much less be able 
to control it.83  Much of what a person believes they have deleted or 
                                                                                                                                     
 76 Id. at 506. 
 77 Id. 
 78 Id. 
 79 Id. 
 80 Id. at 507. 
 81 Orin S. Kerr, Searches and Seizures in a Digital World, 119 HARV. L. REV. 531, 542 
(Dec. 2005). 
 82 See, e.g., Farhad Manjoo, Apple Watch Review: Bliss, but Only at a Steep Learning 
Curve, N.Y. TIMES (Apr. 8, 2015), http://www.nytimes.com/2015/04
/09/technology/personaltech/apple-watch-bliss-but-only-after-a-steep-learning-curve.htm
l?_r=0/ (reviewing the Apple’s revolutionary smartwatch concept, and explaining that “the 
most exciting thing about the Apple Watch isn’t the device itself, but the new tech vistas 
that may be opened by the first mainstream wearable computer.”) 
 83 Id. 
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removed remains on the device in some form, despite the attempted 
erasure,  “mak[ing] it impractical, if not impossible, for individuals to 
make meaningful decisions regarding what digital content to expose to the 
scrutiny that accompanies international travel.” 84 
When a person is subjected to an extensive search of one’s digital 
life, absent any sort of reasonable suspicion, a person is likely to feel a 
level of violation approaching that of a strip search.  Such a search exposes 
the very intimate details of that person’s life, equivalent more to a line-by-
line combing through one’s diary than to the impersonal search of a car.85  
Furthermore: 
[u]nlike searches involving a reassembled gas tank or small hole 
in the bed of a pickup truck, which have minimal or no impact 
beyond the search itself—and little implication for an individual’s 
dignity and privacy interests—the exposure of confidential and 
personal information has permanence. It cannot be undone. 
Accordingly, the uniquely sensitive nature of data on electronic 
devices carries with it a significant expectation of privacy and thus 
renders an exhaustive exploratory search more intrusive than with 
other forms of property.86 
Due to these stark differences, the data that is collected after an 
intrusive forensic search should not be conflated with other types of 
luggage that a person carries across the border.87  This information is not 
mere luggage, but rather an extension of the person.88  It is this 
interconnection between the person and the device that necessitates a 
heightened standard before conducting an intrusive search. 
Not only is the nature of the search results inherently different from 
that which other border searches yield, but the nature of the search itself 
similarly differs.  For instance, “the computer search process tends to be 
more labor intensive and thorough than the physical search of a home.”89  
If this contention is correct, it follows that such searches cannot be 
                                                                                                                                     
 84 United States v. Cotterman, 709 F.3d  952, 965 (9th Cir. 2013). 
 85 Id. at 963. 
 86 Id. at 966 (citations omitted). 
 87 See, e.g., Christine A. Coletta, Laptop Searches at the United States Borders and the 
Border Search Exception to the Fourth Amendment, 48 B.C. L. REV. 971, 1001 (Sept. 
2007)(“Because a computer can contain vast amounts of data that a passenger is unlikely 
to pack for a vacation or trip, a search through its hard drive is not analogous to looking 
through a person’s luggage, wallet, or automobile. It is much more personal, and implicates 
dignity and privacy interests that should contribute to a finding that a laptop search is 
intrusive”). 
 88 John W. Nelson, Border Confidential: Why Searches of Laptop Computers at the 
Border Should Require Reasonable Suspicion, 31 AM. J. TRIAL ADVOC. 137, 140 (2007). 
 89 Orin S. Kerr, Searches and Seizures in a Digital World, 119 HARV. L. REV. 531, 544 
(Dec. 2005)(emphasis added). 
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classified as “routine” under Montoya de Hernandez.  It is for these 
reasons, among others, that the Cotterman court applied a reasonable 
suspicion standard to border searches of personal electronic devices.90 
B. The Ninth Circuit’s Findings in United States v. Cotterman 
Prior to its decision in Cotterman, the Ninth Circuit had developed 
its own understanding of the border search doctrine through prior case law.  
In United States v. Ramos-Saenz, the court attempted to define what the 
Supreme Court meant by a “nonroutine” border search, reasoning that “a 
border search goes beyond the routine only when it reaches the degree of 
intrusiveness present in a strip search or a body cavity search.”91  In 
fashioning this definition, similar to the Supreme Court’s distinction in 
Flores de Montano, the court recognized that there was some level of 
intrusiveness that would bring a border search beyond that which was 
simply “routine,” and thus reasonable per se.92 
The Ninth Circuit, however, initially declined to extend this 
reasoning when it first examined the question of whether the doctrine 
would apply to personal electronic devices in United States v. Arnold.93  In 
Arnold, the court specifically held that “reasonable suspicion is not needed 
to search a laptop or other personal electronic storage devices at the 
border.”94  Despite this holding, the unique characteristics of personal 
electronic devices themselves caused the court to reexamine the doctrine’s 
application to searches of these devices five years later, and flatly reject 
that reasoning when it decided United States v. Cotterman.95 
In Cotterman, the Ninth Circuit analyzed Supreme Court precedent 
in order to reach its ultimate conclusion that reasonable suspicion is 
necessary for extensive border searches of personal electronic devices.96  
The court began by examining the subject of searches and seizures at 
United States borders in general.  “The broad contours of the scope of 
searches at our international borders are rooted in ‘the long-standing right 
of the sovereign to protect itself by stopping and examining persons and 
property crossing into this country.’”97  The court stated that the language 
of Ramsey led to the development of the rule that border searches are 
reasonable purely because they occur at the border.98  Nevertheless, the 
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court asserted that this was not the end of the matter.  The court limited 
Ramsey, proclaiming that the holding “does not mean . . . that at the border 
‘anything goes.’”99  Instead, the key factor remains the “reasonableness” 
of the search, which depends, in turn, on the totality of the 
circumstances.100 
The court recognized that Officer Alvarado’s initial search of 
Cotterman’s laptop did not require reasonable suspicion because it was 
akin to a cursory scan of a package.101  The court acknowledged that, 
“[h]ad the search of Cotterman’s laptop ended with [the initial search, it] 
would be inclined to recognize it was reasonable even without 
particularized suspicion.”102  But the “reasonableness” of the forensic 
examination was, in the court’s view, a far more difficult issue to 
determine.103 
The court began by declining to treat the forensic examination of 
Cotterman’s laptop as a so-called “extended border search,” which require 
particularized suspicion in order to proceed.104  Judge Smith’s dissent 
argued that the forensic examination would qualify as such a search 
because it occurred around one hundred and seventy miles from the border 
and several days after Cotterman attempted to enter the country.105  The 
majority, however, rejected this proposition.106  Rather, the majority 
reasoned that the doctrine was “best confined to cases in which, after an 
apparent border crossing or functional entry, an attenuation in the time or 
the location of conducting a search reflects that the subject has regained 
an expectation of privacy.”107  In this case, although Cotterman was 
allowed to leave the inspection station, his laptop never left the possession 
of the border agents.108  Therefore, Cotterman never regained the 
expectation of privacy recognized by the extended border search 
doctrine.109 
The court similarly disregarded the argument that the forensic 
examination would qualify as a functional border search.110  This doctrine 
involving searches at the “functional equivalent” of United States borders, 
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the court reasoned, was not applicable in Cotterman’s case because the 
search performed was initiated at the actual border.111  By refusing to 
classify the forensic examination as either an extended border search or a 
functional border search, the court adopted its own standard as it applied 
to the search of Cotterman’s computers.  The court asserted that “the 
comprehensive and intrusive nature” of the forensic examination 
necessitated a standard of reasonable suspicion.112 
To justify the adoption of a heightened standard, the Ninth Circuit 
looked to the Supreme Court’s decision in United States v. Flores-
Montano.113  The Ninth Circuit asserted that Flores-Montano stood for the 
proposition that the reasonableness requirement of the Fourth Amendment 
should control border searches.114 Thus, the Ninth Circuit proclaimed that 
such a requirement was necessary, particularly in cases where “searches 
of property are so destructive, particularly offensive, or overly intrusive in 
the manner in which they are carried out.”115  The court argued that 
although the Supreme Court has dealt with a number of border cases over 
the past thirty years, none have been instructive as to when a search is 
“particularly offensive.”116  The issue first appeared in United States v. 
Ramsey,117 but the Court reserved judgment.118  Eight years later, the Court 
had occasion to revisit the issue in United States v. Montoya de 
Hernandez,119 where the Court stated that such suspicion was necessary 
for those searches that went “beyond the scope of a routine customs search 
and inspection.”120  Thus, although the Supreme Court ultimately rejected 
the privacy claim in Flores-Montano, the Ninth Circuit reasoned that the 
Court’s increased focus on highly intrusive searches, going beyond those 
that are simply “routine,” supported the establishment of a reasonableness 
standard in certain situations.121 
After laying the foundation for a reasonableness requirement, the 
Ninth Circuit turned its attention to the privacy interests connected to one’s 
personal electronic devices.122 The court asserted that cases like 
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Cotterman’s involved the implication of “substantial personal privacy 
interests.”123  The court reasoned that “[t]he private information 
individuals store on digital devices – their personal ‘papers’ in the words 
of the Constitution – stands in stark contrast to the generic and impersonal 
contents of a gas tank.”124  The court argued that there were several key 
differences between personal electronic devices and other luggage that 
could constitute “cargo.”125  For instance, the storage capability of 
traditional luggage does not come anywhere close to the amount that one 
can store on electronic devices.126 
Furthermore, electronic devices “contain the most intimate details of 
our lives: financial records, confidential business documents, medical 
records and private emails.”127  The court used this particular characteristic 
to analogize electronic devices to the Fourth Amendment’s guarantee of a 
person’s right to be secure in their “papers.”128 The court asserted that “[i]t 
would be foolish to contend that the degree of privacy secured to citizens 
by the Fourth Amendment has been entirely unaffected by the advance of 
technology.”129 
The court further distinguished between traditional luggage and the 
files that are stored on one’s personal electronic device, by exploring a 
person’s decision-making process in deciding what kinds of “cargo” to 
carry with him or her.130  While a person can decide what to pack in his or 
her traditional luggage, the process is not as simple for electronic devices.  
The court reasoned that while a person is capable in selecting the physical 
items that he or she is travelling with, that same person cannot merely 
remove files on their computer because they are impractical to travel 
with.131  Furthermore, “the volume and often intermingled nature of the 
files” and the fact that “[i]t is also a time-consuming task that may not 
even effectively erase the files” led the court to dispel any suggestion that 
a person could simply not carry certain files with them.132  Even when one 
attempts to delete these files, they may still be retrieved.133  “It is as if a 
search of a person’s suitcase could reveal not only what the bag contained 
on the current trip, but everything it had carried.”134  Thus, the court 
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reasoned that there is an inherent difference in the selection process 
between what a person carries in a personal electronic device versus any 
other typical piece of luggage. 
In recognizing these unique characteristics of personal electronic 
devices, the court explained its reasoning behind advancing a heightened 
standard for these types of border searches.  The court asserted that it was 
not advancing a standard that would make these devices completely “off 
limits” to border agents, but rather it was ensuring that if such searches 
were to take place, they should be held to a standard of reasonableness.135  
The court ultimately asserted that “[i]nternational travelers certainly 
expect that their property will be searched at the border. 
What they do not expect is that, absent some particularizes suspicion, 
agents will mine every last piece of data on their devices or deprive them 
of their most personal property for days.”136  The court, borrowing its 
definition of reasonable suspicion from United States v. Cortez,137  
concluded that the determination of whether or not a search is reasonable 
should be made in light of the totality of the circumstances.138  
Notwithstanding this reasoning, the court nevertheless found that the 
border agents had reasonable suspicion to search Cotterman’s laptops.139 
In reaching its ultimate conclusion, the court asserted that 
Cotterman’s past child molestation conviction, alone, would not be 
enough to give rise to the suspicion necessary to conduct an intrusive 
computer forensic examination.140  Similarly, the court rejected the 
argument that the existence of password-protected files, alone, would be 
enough for reasonable suspicion.141 Because it is commonplace for persons 
not involved in criminal activity to protect their files, the court found 
password protection itself to be “ubiquitous.”142 
Nevertheless, when analyzed in light of a totality of the 
circumstances, the court found the aforementioned indicia to weigh in 
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favor of a finding of reasonableness.143  The following factors, taken 
together, ultimately supported the court’s assertion that the border agents 
had reasonable suspicion when conducting both the initial search and the 
comprehensive forensic examination of Cotterman’s laptop: Cotterman’s 
TECS alert; Cotterman’s prior conviction for child molestation; 
Cotterman’s frequent travels; the fact that Cotterman was attempting to 
cross the border from a country known for sex tourism (Mexico); 
Cotterman’s collection of electronic equipment; the fact that Cotterman 
had password-protected his files; and the parameters of the system that 
was used to identify registered sex offenders.144  Thus, although the Ninth 
Circuit ultimately adopted a new standard for border searches of electronic 
devices, the border agents who searched Cotterman’s laptop had the 
requisite level of suspicion for performing a comprehensive forensic 
examination. 
C. A Step In The Right Direction: The United States Supreme Court’s 
Decision in Riley v. California 
Less than a year after the Ninth Circuit handed down its decision in 
Cotterman, the United States Supreme Court granted certiorari in two 
companion cases whose effects have potential to change the judicial 
landscape surrounding warrantless searches of electronic devices.145  In 
the first case, David Riley had been pulled over for driving with expired 
tags.146  After learning that Riley was also driving with a suspended 
license, the officer impounded Riley’s car and arrested Riley after an 
inventory search turned up two handguns under the car’s hood.147  An 
officer then searched Riley incident to arrest, seizing Riley’s cell phone in 
the process.148  The officer looked through the phone, noticing the letters 
“CK” appear multiple times, a label which he believed to stand for the 
moniker “Crip Killers,” used to describe members of the Bloods gang.149  
Thus, two hours later, a detective further examined the phone’s content, 
looking for more evidence of gang activity.150  This search ultimately 
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turned up videos and photographs which linked Riley to the Bloods gang 
and a car that had been involved in a shooting a few weeks earlier.151 
In the companion case, a police officer witnessed Brima Wurie sell 
drugs from his car.152  After Wurie was arrested and brought to the police 
station, officers seized two cell phones from Wurie’s person.153  The 
officers noticed that the phone was receiving phone calls from the same 
number, identified as “my house” on the phone’s external screen.154  After 
opening the phone and accessing its call log, the officers traced the number 
associated with “my house” back to an apartment building.155  Upon 
searching the apartment, pursuant to a warrant, the officers found and 
seized “215 grams of crack cocaine, marijuana, drug paraphernalia, a 
firearm and ammunition, and cash.”156  Wurie was subsequently charged 
based on this evidence.157 
The Supreme Court began the opinion by reflecting on its own 
precedent regarding searches incident to arrest.158  More relevant to the 
present inquiry, however, the Court then highlighted the changes that 
advancing technology bring to the Fourth Amendment analysis.159  The 
Court reasoned that cell phones “are now such a pervasive and insistent 
part of daily life that the proverbial visitor from Mars might conclude they 
were an important feature of human anatomy.”160  Thus, like the Ninth 
Circuit’s analysis in Cotterman, the Supreme Court was similarly forced 
to focus its analysis on the balance between an individual’s privacy and 
the promotion of government interests.161  In doing so, the Court refused 
to adopt a mechanical approach to its interpretation of Fourth Amendment 
precedent.162  Ultimately, the Court decided that, due to the inherent 
differences between a physical search and a search of cell phone 
information, officers must secure a warrant before conducting such an 
intrusive search.163 
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D. Why the Ninth Circuit’s Reasonable Suspicion Standard Should be 
Adopted in Light of Riley 
As the Ninth Circuit announced in its decision, “[a] person’s digital 
life ought not be hijacked simply by crossing a border.”164  While the 
Fourth Circuit’s findings in Ickes are persuasive, these findings do not 
override what the Supreme Court has established in its border search 
doctrine precedent.165  As the doctrine itself has developed, there has been 
more reluctance on the Court’s part to follow the blanket rule set forth in 
Ramsey.166 
There are stark differences between opening someone’s mail and 
digging through personal files stored on one’s computer.  For instance, 
“[e]lectronic devices often retain sensitive and confidential information far 
beyond the perceived point of erasure, notably in the form of browsing 
histories and records of deleted files.”167 These files cannot be equated to 
a traveler’s usual “cargo,” as the Ickes court noted.  Computers themselves 
work through the interplay of hardware and software components.168  A 
computer’s hardware includes “the parts of a computer that you can see 
and touch, including the case and everything inside it.”169  While this 
aspect of a computer easily fits the definition adopted by the Fourth 
Circuit, the computer’s software and files are more difficult to classify as 
“goods transported by a vessel, airplane, or vehicle.”170  As opposed to a 
computer’s hardware, its “[s]oftware refers to the instructions, or 
programs, that tell the hardware what to do.”171  While software may be 
seen as “goods” on one level, the differences inherent between the two 
components should be taken into account in the larger analysis. 
Furthermore, computers are multi-faceted devices.  A person’s 
computer therefore has endless possibilities in the types of uses and 
information associated with it.  “In the workplace, many people use 
computers to keep records, analyze data, do research, and manage projects. 
At home, [they] can use computers to find information, store pictures and 
music, track finances, play games, and communicate with others—and 
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those are just a few of the possibilities.”172  In order for a border agent to 
perform a search with the level of intrusiveness that was found in 
Cotterman, it should follow that there was some amount of suspicion on 
their part before the search was conducted.  Otherwise, virtually every 
aspect of a person’s digital life will be available for inspection at the will 
of those working at the United States border. 
Since Ramsey, Supreme Court precedent has displayed an ever-
increasing awareness that the border search doctrine is more flexible than 
it appears on its face.  While the U.S. Department of Homeland Security 
(“DHS”) is authorized to conduct the “inspection, examination, and search 
of vehicles, persons, baggage and merchandise . . . to ensure compliance 
with any law or regulation enforced or administered by DHS,”173 the Court 
has recognized certain types of searches to necessitate a heightened 
standard.  Such was the case in Montoya de Hernandez, in which the Court 
discussed the need for reasonableness before a border agent performs a 
rectal examination.174  While searching a person’s computer is not the 
equivalent of a search of a person’s alimentary canal, the emphasis the 
Court placed on the intrusive nature of the search is nevertheless 
instructive.175 
Even when a search is not particularly offensive, “[f]or those pulled 
aside for a secondary inspection . . . the experience can be distressing, 
resulting in a missed connecting flight, a prolonged interrogation, 
and . . . the loss of a laptop necessary for [his or her] livelihood.”176  
Distress related to such searches only increases when the search becomes 
more intrusive.  Around five thousand people were subjected to electronic 
media searches between October 1, 2012 and August 31, 2013, which 
amounts to about fifteen such searches a day.177  If these numbers continue 
to increase without any guidance or restraint, intrusive computer 
examinations will become the types of routine searches allowed by 
Montoya de Hernandez.  This trend is particularly alarming given the 
privacy concerns implicated by border searches of electronic devices. 
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Although addressing a separate exception to the Fourth 
Amendment’s warrant requirement, Riley provides valuable insight into 
how this issue should be viewed moving forward across Fourth 
Amendment jurisprudence as a whole.  As the Supreme Court recognized 
in Riley, personal technological devices, such as cell phones, “place vast 
quantities of personal information literally in the hands of individuals.”178  
While the Court acknowledged the tremendous government interest in that 
information, particularly given concerns regarding the potential loss of 
evidence, it also realized that there are other ways to alleviate those 
concerns.179  “If ‘the police are truly confronted with a “now or never 
situation.’” – for example, circumstances suggesting that a defendant’s 
phone will be the target of an imminent remote-wipe attempt – they may 
be able to rely on exigent circumstances to search the phone 
immediately.”180 
By contrast, the privacy concerns implicated in a cell phone search 
are far greater than those of physical items that the Supreme Court has 
addressed in the past.181  The inherent differences between the two types 
of items are apparent.  “Most people cannot lug around every piece of mail 
they have received for the past several months, every picture they have 
taken, or every book or article they have read – nor would they have any 
reason to attempt to do so.”182  Thus, the limitations that exist with searches 
of physical containers do not apply to personal electronic devices, as 
devices like cell phones can store vast amounts of data that would be 
impractical, if not impossible, to carry on the person physically.183  
Moreover, 
[t]he fact that a search in the pre-digital era could have turned up 
a photograph or two in a wallet does not justify a search of 
thousands of photos in a digital gallery.  The fact that someone 
could have tucked a paper bank statement in a pocket does not 
justify a search of every bank statement from the last five years.  
And to make matters worse, such an analogue test would allow 
law enforcement to search a range of items contained on a phone, 
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even though people would be unlikely to carry such a variety of 
information in physical form.184 
Searches of electronic devices would also allow access to types of 
information that a physical search would never reveal.185  Such 
information may not only be on the device itself, but stored remotely on 
servers through the ever-increasing use of “cloud computing.”186 
As the Court recognized, albeit with a particular focus on cell phones 
in the search incident to arrest context, the unique characteristics of one’s 
personal electronic devices require that there be some sort of shield against 
suspicionless searches, given the tremendous privacy interests at stake.187  
That is not to say that security at our nation’s borders is not paramount.188  
Rather, there are times when the government must realize that the nature 
of certain types of searches goes too far when weighed against an 
individual’s privacy interests.189  An intrusive search of one’s personal 
electronic devices without at least a minimal requirement of reasonable 
suspicion is one of those times.  When an “exhaustive forensic search of a 
copied laptop hard drive” is performed, it “intrudes upon privacy and 
dignity interests to a far greater degree than a cursory search at the 
border.”190  Such a search should be held to the reasonableness 
requirement of the Fourth Amendment, rather than falling under the 
general exemption of the border search doctrine.191  The reasonable 
suspicion standard advanced by the Ninth Circuit should, thus, be adopted 
by the Supreme Court in order to resolve this circuit split. 
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PART IV: CONCLUSION 
With the growth and development of technology, the law must 
evolve to reflect the changing times.  No longer should courts be able to 
hold onto strict applications of rules that were created before certain 
technologies came into existence.  The border search doctrine is one of 
those rules that must develop accordingly.  The reasonable suspicion 
standard adopted by the Ninth Circuit in United States v. Cotterman 
properly addresses the privacy concerns associated with one’s digital life, 
while maintaining the tremendous need for security at United States 
borders.  It ensures that individuals at our borders maintain some level of 
personal and digital dignity.  Any lesser standard would subject every 
international traveler to “[what is] essentially a computer strip search.”192  
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